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Abstract Starting with service robotics and industrial robotics, this paper aims to
suggest philosophical reﬂections about the relationship between body and machine,
between man and technology in our contemporary world. From the massive use of
the cell phone to the robots which apparently ‘‘feel’’ and show emotions like
humans do. From the wearable exoskeleton to the prototype reproducing the arti-
ﬁcial sense of touch, technological progress explodes to the extent of embodying
itself in our nakedness. Robotics, indeed, is inspired by biology in order to develop a
new kind of technology affecting human life. This is a bio-robotic approach, which
is fulﬁlled in the ﬁgure of the cyborg and consequently in the loss of human nature.
Today, humans have reached the possibility to modify and create their own body
following their personal desires. But what is the limit of this achievement? For this
reason, we all must question ourselves whether we have or whether we are a body.
Nowadays, the presence of robots in our society is increasing and the same criteria
for a classiﬁcation of robotics are multiple and often questionable. Traditionally, we
can distinguish between industrial and service robotics. It is a distinction which is,
nowadays, more of a historical value than of a substantial one. For industrial
robotics, in fact, it is common to identify manufacturing applications mostly carried
out with manipulators (anthropomorphically or not), which have been adopted with
the primary aim of helping man in repetitive, heavy, and dangerous tasks. The
success of this type of applications is related to the effectiveness of the robotic
production in terms of performance (accuracy, repeatability, and reliability) and,
therefore, of economy. The term of service robotics is used to identify systems of
mobile robots such as land, marine, aeronautical, or space vehicles equipped with
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The applications of service robotics include surveillance, collection of environ-
mental information, logistics, and domestic tasks such as mowing the lawn in the
garden or cleaning the ﬂoors of the house. The diversity and pervasiveness of the
robots in our daily lives are, however, not limited to certain traditional contexts of
industrial and service robotics. The robotics research of recent decades has
advanced in different directions: one is that of autonomy, that is, by developing
systems capable of dealing in environments not completely structured and known in
advance (such as, for example, a cell of industrial production) by delegating to the
robot the ability to ‘‘decide’’ when unforeseen situations arise. In this context,
the results are remarkable, as evidenced by, for example, the success of the
realization of prototype cars that can drive autonomously on roads for very long
distances or in the development of teams of underwater robots showing ‘‘cognitive’’
abilities in navigation and guidance. We can talk about abilities exceeding the ﬁgure
of the robot, that is, the cyborg (Palese 2011), because in our contemporary world,
the advanced scientiﬁc progress combines the artiﬁcial reality with the human and
the natural one, as the technique is embodied in each of us and thus becomes an
extension of the body. It is not only the way, in which the artiﬁcial element is
presented, that changes, but also the relationship between technology and
humankind. This relationship incorporates in itself an extensive material that is
not a simple supplement of Gehlen’s (1990) instinctual lack, but is the beginning of
the transformation of the body and its way of unleashing. The body exists and
widens in the world with the artiﬁcial dimension. As a result, the artiﬁcial
intelligence seems to coincide with the existence, which becomes the place where
the characteristic feature is the absence of nature as technology rather than simply
besieging the outside, technology has installed itself in our members. Therefore,
today, the classical view is disappearing, namely that the technique would be a
supplement to a nature lacking in something, since the artiﬁcial, now, coincides with
our being naked and with our body in which continuous technology ﬂows are
embodied. The bodies are nothing but open dimensions to contact, exposed to an
otherness that radiates up to make the body coincides with technology. It introduces
itself as ‘‘body given, multiplied, multisexed, multiﬁgured, multizoned, phallic and
aphallic, cephalic and acephalic, organized and inorganic’’ (Nancy 2007). The body,
therefore, incorporates and adopts a continuous and constant metamorphosis, and
man becomes a union between artiﬁcial and biological creation in which nature and
culture ﬁnally ﬁnd their meeting point, cancelling each other in favor of a neighbor
as ‘‘te ´chne’’—creation, the true art of our world. The whole life is resolved into a set
of technical reports and technical conditions, which are the matrices of an
‘‘ecotecnia that creates the world of bodies’’ (Nancy 2007). These bodies seem to be
totally eradicated from any possibility of being absolutely and completely immersed
in the dynamic ﬂow and a continuous ﬂux in their changing. Transformation and
transmutation are the attributes that determine both the way of being or having a
body (Fromm 1976) in our contemporary age in which we see the overlap or rather
the perfect coincidence between technology and nature, body and machine. This
fusion between technology and the human body can have a positive and a negative
meaning. In the positive meaning, technique is presented as a substantial imitation
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to get back into life, in his bodily dimension. In this case, the artiﬁcial element
becomes one with the natural rhythm of the body as it follows each performance
mode, every way to perform the natural bodily function. Two distinct forces, natural
and artiﬁcial, are united not as compensation but as incorporation and embodiment.
The technique embodies and becomes itself the body which escapes the fate,
evolving in anti-fate, since man presents himself as being able to choose, to self-
produce and regenerate, following, however, the map of the natural ﬂow of life. For
instance, a pacemaker implanted in the body is a machine which is embodied as it
participates in the functions of the body, allowing the heart to normalize its beat, to
return to its natural rhythm. A device, therefore, that joins the body, thanks to its
biocompatibility. It is compatible with the body, which means that it is a natural
element for it. A technique that makes you one with nature in the ‘‘compassion’’—
which stems from ‘‘cum patior’’—in the suffering together, for which the artiﬁcial
element is joined to the natural. Moreover, we can consider the events of 2010 when
the ﬁrst permanent artiﬁcial heart transplant took place in Rome and the double
hand transplant in Monza. These examples help us to understand how technological
development can replace human body parts and save humans from their fate. It is a
robotic technology inspired by biology and related to biomedical applications. The
studies of bio-mechanical and bio-mimetic robotics have led, for example, to the
realization of prosthesis arts, which are increasingly sophisticated and effective and
may be interfaced with the nervous system of the user. Similar technologies have
led to the development of exoskeletons that can help people in their mobility. Then,
there is the frontier of the so-called neuromorphic technologies (Neuromorphic
Engineering and Neuroinformatics) that are involved in the study and realization of
artiﬁcial systems designed on the basis of studies on human or animal physiology.
The results in this context are of great interest not only in terms of basic research,
but certainly also for applications that include, for example, the artiﬁcial retina
which, hopefully, will restore sight for some people 1 day.
However, if acting on the body requires to possess it as one thing that occurs to
make a choice, a desire, a taste, it means that through the manipulation of the body,
we are not only in the realm of having, but we also choose of being. In shaping the
body you have, you can model it depending on what you want to be like so that in
such a paradigm it becomes what you want to appear like. Here, the being becomes
mere appearance, losing all the ways of true determination and proper speaking;
man is not a being but a ‘‘becoming’’ in perpetual change, since he can become all
and recreate himself as he likes to. Thus, in our contemporary world, to have is
gobbled up by to become and, consequently, man loses his essence and remains only
with appearance.
Just the appearance is based on the consideration of the body as the wrapper with
contingent and accessorial qualities, changing over time and lacking of internal. To
be and to have take on a relationship of mutual interconnection, both relying on the
rejection of the body as a primary branch of life and as the ultimate expression of
the generative process of nature. Having a body means, in fact, to reify it, to
manipulate it according to its own voluntary rational force. Being a body means to
build and realize our individuality through attributes that are assigned and which
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grammatical denotation of identity’’ (From 1976), quite different from being as an
essence. To be a body should, therefore, assume the value of an existence which
considers man as having an essence and a very precise and speciﬁc nature. That
goes beyond that being, meant as copula, arising from the consideration of the body
as entity with countless accessories determining the identity of a subject. Hence, to
exist as a body can have a negative and a positive sense. In the positive meaning,
being a body makes us consider an entire and unique being presupposing a certain
sacredness of what we are. In the negative meaning, however, being a body, meant
as a determination of the individuality of a man through his physical characteristics,
means to join being with having being and consider the body as something through
which to appear in the contingency of the human condition. The manipulability of
the body, in fact, puts the man into an existence, which, by becoming one with the
historical ﬂow, acquires an acute sense abandoning the natural, biological, and vital
dimension. Just at this temporality of the dimensions of present–past–future, we see
the perspectivism of Dilthey (2012), asserting that man, endowed with reason and
will, descends into a kind of historical self-production which determines him as an
actor, able to manage the body that he is and he has. Man thus considers himself
outside of his simple life, in the sphere of what makes him human, that is, being in
the existence, a situation based on the individual’s knowledge of the self but also the
knowledge of the non-self, making it being that may even be different than himself.
The human being changes and becomes a person that makes him by himself. His body,
its physical elements, seems to insert into a sphere of substantive subordination to their
choices, their capacity and ability to change, of mutation and manipulation. The
existing body thus becomes the creation of man himself, his real essence, which
does not arise from human nature, but from the rationality of human action, giving
culture the primacy over nature since existing assumes a central role compared to
living. The biological body is, therefore, regarded as a pure substrate on which to
exercise their sovereignty, becoming an ‘‘object body’’. However, the action of a
rational human being on their own animality is nothing but the estrangement of
human beings from themselves, denying the body as a point of radiation and
derivation of existence, deprived of the natural ﬂow of life. Indeed, it seems that the
very existence acquires a signiﬁcant value through the separation from life that,
abandoning its natural and organic state of being, assumes human, anthropological,
cultural, and historical characteristics (Parsi 1998). It is only in the historical self-
production that man strives to increase his potentiality and self-generation. In
addition to making explicit a complete distrust of modern man against the natural
processes, this self-generation seems to be a mode of elevation and determining the
human which, taking the distances from animality, increasingly acquires his own
existential characterization (Bauman 1998). Therefore, the terms poiesis and genesis
have become, by now, inseparable, and their substantial interchangeability has
inevitably led to a poiesis naturans, that is, toward a complete substitution of human
production of natural generation. Man, therefore, becomes an individual existing,
being purged from his animality because he can control, manage, and direct it. And
in order to manage the biological life, it is necessary to identify the origin of itself,
which, in this case, can be nothing but the body from which the most authentic
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excellence, the body returns to be the object (Bauman 2005) the battleﬁeld and the
meeting point on which the post-modern human beings challenge themselves
imposing their beloved voluntary rational character on those humiliating and
‘‘indifferent’’ biological mechanisms belonging to the body and to the living
organism. The technological man, therefore, appears as being inﬁnitely a creator of
himself and able to improve, enhance, and self-correct the body he has, he is and by
which he appears (Bauman 2010).
When we think of having a body, we come to the individual appropriation of it
and when we consider to be a body, we do nothing but open the doors to political
reappropriation of our body, because a process of individualization is triggered by it.
Even being a body is now determined through a mechanism of individualization and
subjectivation (Rousseau 1762). An example, in this sense, is the case with the Nazi
experience when it was empirically thought to be not a policy of the body, but a
policy on life, on the bodies, that is, a thanatopolitics (Figiani 2008). It is nowadays
present every day wherever human life is conceived outside of man himself,
legitimizing the rational-voluntary domain on the animal-biological one. Moreover,
we could easily argue that totalitarianism and liberalism assume a common
denominator, namely the mastery of man over his animal nature, in that, if for
Nazism, man is his own body, and only it, for Liberalism, according to Locke
(2010), man has and owns his own body—and therefore he can use, transform, or
sell it as a domestic slave. Thus, the conceptual categories of liberalism overturn the
Nazist perspective (Arendt 1998) transferring the ownership of the body from state
to individual. This means that, when we think we have a body, we come to the
individual appropriation of it and, when we think of being a body, we do nothing but
open the doors to political reappropriation of our body, because this condition starts
a process of individualization and it ceases to be a natural essence of man (De Nardi
1999).
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